LGA report
GLA Report on Postal Voting
Electoral offences in London following the local elections of May 2006
Report: 14
Date: 26 October 2006
By: Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations on behalf of the
Commissioner Summary

Around 30 offences arising from the local elections of May 2006 have
been or are under investigation by SO12 (Special Branch), now SO15
(CTC).This excludes an extensive investigation currently under way in
the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, where a range of offences, mainly
relating to postal voting, are under investigation. This will be a
protracted inquiry.Postal voting on demand remains a serious area of
vulnerability where the integrity of the electoral process is
concerned. New legislation will address, but not eliminate this
problem.

A. Recommendation
That the report be noted.

B. Supporting information

1. This report updates the Authority on the current position in
relation to electoral offences in the Metropolitan Police District
(MPD), following the local elections of May 2006. This reports seeks
to address the scale and location of such offences, the types of
offences under investigation and also some common features and
particular issues relating to electoral offences.

2. Within the MPS, election offences (often referred to as electoral
fraud), are investigated by the Special Prosecutions Unit (SPU) of the
Counter Terrorism Command (CTC - SO15), as such investigations were
previously the remit of SO12 (Special Branch). In relation to the
local elections of 4 May 2006, around 30 separate investigations have
taken, or are currently taking place. The scale of these
investigations differs enormously, from simple allegations involving
technical breaches of election law through to a major investigation
currently underway in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, where a
wide range of apparent fraudulent activity is being investigated. The
complexity of these investigations makes it difficult to be precise in
counting the number of individual offences involved. A number of these
investigations have already concluded, whereas some allegations may be
the subject of criminal charges, following directions from the Crown
Prosecution Service.

3. Prior to the May 2006 elections, officers from the SPU visited
appropriate figures in all major parties to brief them about our
response to allegations of electoral offences, and to offer advice on
any issues they wished to raise. Additionally, early contact was made
with council electoral services managers and with the Association of
Electoral Administrators (London Branch). Briefing material was made
available to uniformed response officers and other relevant parts of
the MPS, and information about electoral offences was broadcast via
the MPS intranet. This activity meant that parties, councils and
police officers had a ‘single point of contact’ from which they could
seek help and advice on election-related offences. The Representation
of the People Act 1983 places a duty on the Director of Public
Prosecutions (DPP) to “…make such inquiries and institute such
prosecutions as the circumstances appear…” [1]. In practice, this
means that the SPU refer any allegations of electoral offences to the
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) (who discharge this duty on behalf of
the DPP) at a very early stage in the investigation, and continue to
liaise closely with the CPS throughout the investigation. The SPU has
an excellent relationship with the relevant CPS department and this
has led to the swift resolution of a number of alleged offences.

4. Election offences have been alleged across a range of London
Boroughs, and there is no particular pattern to the spread of these
offences. Similarly, offences under investigation involve the full
range of political parties, and include sitting councillors,
candidates, elections agents, canvassers and party activists. Offences
reported include falsification of nomination papers, impersonation,
making false statements about candidates, undue influence on voters,
failing to include an ‘imprint’ on election publicity material and
non-submission of expenses.

5. One area that has caused, and continues to cause, a great deal of
concern is the spread of postal voting on demand. The process of
postal voting removes some of the safeguards that come with the
traditional method of casting a vote at a polling station, primarily
the secrecy of the ballot. There are a number of ways that the postal
voting system can be abused, and such abuse can amount to criminal
offences of forgery, deception and conspiracy to defraud. The SPU has
also seen evidence of a range of questionable practices which call
into question the integrity of the postal voting system, but would not
amount to criminal offences in their own right. Such activity could be
termed ‘sharp practice’. A ‘Code of Conduct’ [2] was prepared jointly
by the Electoral Commission and the main political parties, to deal
with handling of applications to vote by post and also the handling of
postal ballots. It gives clear advice on what is and what is not
considered acceptable practice. The ‘Code of Conduct’ has no force in
law and the SPU has seen evidence of the Code being ignored by
candidates and their supporters.

6. The SPU has received a large number of allegations regarding postal
voting irregularities in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets (LBTH).
These allegations have received a considerable amount of local and
national press coverage. A number of allegations relating to electoral
offences in LBTH were made during the General Election of 2005 (which
were the subject of scrutiny by the Greater London Assembly [3]), but
there was not sufficient evidence to bring a prosecution. It was not
surprising that similar allegations were made this year. Indeed, this
was anticipated in a letter from the MPS to the Chairman of the
Election Review Committee. LBTH Council informed the SPU at an early
stage that they believed that suspicious activity was occurring in
relation to postal vote applications, and liaison with the electoral
services department took place immediately. The scale and range of the
offences alleged meant that a separate investigative team was set up
to deal solely with these allegations, and it will continue to work on
these matters for the foreseeable future. The nature of the alleged
offences being dealt with in LBTH include the fraudulent multiple
redirection of postal votes, apparent clusters of disenfranchisement,
postal ballot papers being received by those who have not applied for
them, postal votes applied for and subsequently not received and
various allegations of third parties filling in postal vote
application forms and postal ballot papers. This list is by no means
exhaustive. It is not possible to go into more detail here as this may
compromise ongoing lines of enquiry. This will be a protracted
investigation.

7. It is the view of the SPU that widespread use of postal votes has
opened up a whole new area to be exploited by the fraudster, and the
opportunity has been taken. It is difficult to assess if abuse of
postal voting has altered the outcome of local elections, but it is
possible. It is the view of the SPU that the postal voting system must
be properly managed and scrutinised, otherwise the integrity of the
electoral system will be compromised. Previously, council electoral
services whilst being responsible for the administration of elections,
did not have a clear remit, or the resources, to effectively
scrutinise the postal voting system. Nor was there a requirement for
postal vote applicants to provide enough information on the
application form to allow effective scrutiny. This will change under
the Electoral Administration Act 2006, parts of which are already in
force.

8. The Electoral Administration Act 2006 has introduced new criminal
offences of furnishing false information, or failing to supply
information to an electoral registration officer, and also an offence
of making a false application to vote by post or by proxy. The Act
also places a duty on electoral registration officers to take
necessary steps to produce a complete and accurate electoral register.
This will require some degree of scrutiny of postal vote applications
on the part of local councils. Additionally, the Act requires that all
new applicants for postal votes provide their date of birth as well as
their signature in a specified manner (i.e. in a way that can be
digitally recorded). These changes should make the detection and
prosecution of electoral fraud somewhat easier, and will also have a
deterrent value. The Electoral Commission continues to press for
further legislative changes (e.g. individual electoral registration,
rather than household registration) that should reduce the risk of
electoral fraud even further. Officers from the SPU have previously
given evidence to a Commons Select Committee on electoral fraud
matters, and will continue to support the Electoral Commission in
their efforts to promote confidence in and increase the integrity of
the electoral system.

C. Race and equality impact

1. It is believed that communities where English is a second language
are vulnerable to being disenfranchised or otherwise subjected to
‘sharp practice’ where postal votes are concerned. This is because
postal voting application forms can appear complex and can result in
assistance being sought to complete such forms. This leads to third
parties being given an opportunity to apply for postal ballots where
this is not the preference of the voter, to re-direct postal ballot
forms, or even for postal ballot papers to be handed over to third
parties. There is evidence that such activity has occurred within the
Bengali community in Tower Hamlets.

2. Electoral law requires that formal documents used in elections are
produced solely in English and Welsh. It is understood that some
‘supplementary’ material is produced in other languages, but it may be
that more work could be done to ensure that those who do not have
English as a first language understand their right to vote in the way
that they prefer, and that they have a right to cast their vote,
postal or otherwise, in secret.

3. Anecdotally, some community contacts have remarked on how some
practices that are seen as acceptable outside the UK have been adopted
in respect of UK elections – for example, the head of an extended
family instructing family members to vote for a particular party or
candidate. Postal voting increases this risk, as the safeguard of a
truly secret ballot is removed.

D. Financial implications
There are no known financial implications.

E. Background papers
None

F. Contact details
Report author: Special Prosecutions Unit SO15 Counter Terrorism
Command, MPS